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The War on Terror: Constitutional Governance
in a State of Permanent Warfare?
¶1
It is widely assumed that the War on Terror requires re-balancing society's needs
for liberty and security through mechanisms by which security can be bought only at the
price of liberty.

¶2
Following September 11, 2001 (9/11), many are prepared to buy "security"
without regard to cost. The urgency of taking steps to prevent violent attacks on civilians
is obvious; remembrance of the thousands buried by an ocean of rubble cascading from
the heavens demands action. Everyone who has flown in an airplane, visited office
towers, or shared moments of life with bright, spirited people like those who work in
places such as the World Trade Center, can identify with the horror. The recollection is
dreadful, traumatizing, and horrific. However, thinking in terms of dichotomies such as
these is both misleading and dangerous. Clear thinking is needed if we are to begin to
properly assess the issues that face our society as it confronts the threat of international
terrorism. Although Canada's War on Terror has involved both military deployment (in
Afghanistan and at sea) and law-making at home, my immediate concern is with the
implications of this new War for constitutionalism and the Rule of Law within Canada.
I. CANADIAN LEGISLATION
¶3
Canada responded quickly to 9/11 by introducing the Anti-Terrorism Act, and the
Public Safety Act. [See Note 1 below] The former enacts the Charities Registration
(Security Information) Act [See Note 2 below] and amends fully twenty other statutes
while the most recent version of the Public Safety Act would amend twenty-three
existing statutes and enact a new statute on biological and toxin weapons. [See Note 3
below] A secondary package includes restrictions on public protest, [See Note 4 below]
plans for increased surveillance of private communications, [See Note 5 below]
monitoring of individual travel through a 'big brother' database, [See Note 6 below]
changes in provincial legislation, [See Note 7 below] proposals to create a "National
Identity Card," [See Note 8 below] and numerous changes in the law and practice of
immigration and citizenship. [See Note 9 below] Moreover, much law-making happens
by stealth through virtually invisible changes in delegated legislation or state practice,
[See Note 10 below] precisely at the points where citizen and state connect most directly.
[See Note 11 below]

Note 1: Bill C-36, An Act to amend the Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence
Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the
registration of charities, in order to combat terrorism, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001 (assented to 18 December
2001), S.C. 2001, c. 41 [Anti-Terrorism Act]; Bill C-17, An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to
enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance
public safety, 2d Sess., 37th Parl., 2002 (as amended by the Legislative Committee on C-17, 7 May 2003)
[Public Safety Act]. The current version of the proposed Public Safety Act replaced the earlier Bill C-55,
An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures for implementing the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2002 (first reading 29 April 2002), in order to enhance public
safety, which, in turn, replaced Bill C-42, An Act to amend certain Acts of Canada, and to enact measures
for implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, in order to enhance public safety, 1st
Sess., 37th Parl., 2001 (first reading 22 November 2001), abandoned in the face of criticism. Bill C-44, An
Act to amend the Aeronautics Act, 1st. Sess., 37th Parl., 2001 (assented to 18 December 2001), S.C. 2001,
c. 38, amending the Aeronautics Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. A-2, on instructions from the United States, had
originally been part of the Public Safety Act.
Note 2: Anti-Terrorism Act, ibid., s. 113.

Note 3: Public Safety Act, ibid., s. 106.
Note 4: In the innocuous sounding Bill C-35, Act to amend the Foreign Missions and International
Organizations Act, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001 (assented to 30 April 2002), S.C. 2002, c. 12, section 5
authorizes a kind of "police exclusion zone." A number of international conferences have revealed the line
between protection from terrorism and improper quelling of political dissent to be indistinct as police
consistently create political cordon sanitaires around such events. See W. W. Pue, "The Prime Minister's
Police? Commissioner Hughes' APEC report" (2001) 39(1) Osgoode Hall L. J. 165; W. Wesley Pue, ed.,
Pepper in our eyes: The APEC Affair (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2000); Kent
Roach, September 11: Consequences for Canada (McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003) at 69-70
[September 11]. House of Commons Debates, 117 (22 November 2001) at 1130 (Svend Robinson) online:
Canada's Parliament http://www.parl.gc.ca/ 37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/117_2001-11-22/
han117_1130-E.htm (date accessed: 18 May 2003); House of Commons Debates, 121 (29 November 2001)
at 1210 (Francine Lalonde), online: Canada's Parliament http://www.parl.gc.ca/
37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/121_2001-11-29/ han121_1210-E.htm (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
Note 5: A Department of Justice consultation paper proposes compelling Internet Service Providers
(ISPs) to provide police with the names and addresses of customers, widening police search powers,
requiring ISPs to retain customer web logs for up to six months, and outlawing possession of computer
viruses. Canada, Department of Justice, Lawful Access, (Ottawa: 25 August 2002) online:
www.canada.justice.gc.ca/ en/cons/la_al/ (date accessed: 17 June 2003). Such proposals threaten "the
fundamental values and fabric of Canadian society" according to the Electronic Frontier Canada and
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Memorandum from Electronic Frontier Canada and Electronic Frontier
Foundation to Lawful Access Consultation (17 December 2002) online: Electronic Frontier Canada
http://www.efc.ca/pages/surveillance/ lawful.doc. cf (date accessed: 17 June 2003). See also, Memorandum
from British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to Lawful Access Consultation (16 December 2002)
online: http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/02lawfulaccess.html (date accessed: 17 June 2003).
Note 6: Letter from George Radwanski, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, to the Hon. Elinor Caplan,
Minister of National Revenue (26 September 2002) online: Privacy Commissioner of Canada
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/nr-c/ 02_05_b_020926_e.asp (date accessed: 17 June 2003). See also,
Letter from Ann Cavoukian, Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario to the Hon. Elinor Caplan,
Minister of National Revenue (30 September 2002) online: Privacy Commissioner of Canada
http://www.privcom.gc.ca/media/ ac_020930_e.asp (date accessed 17 June 2003).
Note 7: For example, see Security Management Statutes Amendment Act, S.A. 2002, c. 32.
Note 8: See Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, News Release, "A National Identity
Card: Points on which the Committee Invites Comments" online: Canada's Parliament
http://www.parl.gc.ca/InfoComDoc/37/2/CIMM/ PressReleases/CIMMpr5-e.htm (date accessed: 17 June
2003); Memorandum from British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to the Standing Committee on
Citizenship and Immigration regarding a National ID Card (19 February 2003) online:
http://www.bccla.org/positions/privacy/03nationalidcard.html (date accessed: 18 May 2003).
Note 9: See Bill C-18, An Act respecting Canadian citizenship, 2d Sess., 37th Parl., 2002 (first reading 31
October 2002).
Note 10: The Government surreptitiously implemented much of the Anti-Terrorism Act by regulation
while the Act was before Parliament: Canada, United Nations Suppression of Terrorism Regulations,
SOR/2001-360. See also The United States of America v. Liban M. Hussein, [2001] O.J. No. 5812 (QL)
(Factum of the Appellant) online: Edelson & Associates
www.edelsonandassociates.com/articles/Applicant%27s% 20Factum.pdf (date accessed: 27 June 2003).

Note 11: For example, racial profiling practices and non-legislated bilateral agreements. See September
11, supra note 4 at 68-74 (on racial profiling) and the Smart Border Declaration section in Canadian Bar
Association, Report, "In The Shadow Of The Law: A Report by the International Civil Liberties
Monitoring Group (ICLMG) in response to Justice Canada's 1st annual report on the application of the
Anti-Terrorism Act (Bill C-36)" (14 May 2003) online: http://www.cba.org/cba/news/pdf/shadow.pdf (date
accessed: 27 June 2003). For additional information, see Reem Bahdi, "No Exit: Racial Profiling and
Canada's War Against Terrorism" (2003) 41 Osgoode Hall L.J. 293.

II. BY WHAT PRINCIPLES SHOULD SECURITY BE ORGANIZED?
¶4
Our traditions and constitutional "morality of aspiration" suggest that five
principles should guide law-making:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.

All law should seek to attain minimal infringement of civil liberty.
There should be maximum clarity of definition regarding powers
conferred, restrictions imposed, and offences created.
All exercise of governmental power should be accountable, visible,
and reviewable by the ordinary courts in the ordinary ways. The core
constitutional principle of responsible government requires clear and
effective channels of political and legal accountability.
Secrecy should only be tolerated in the smallest possible zone, only
as absolutely essential, and only for limited duration. Power
exercised in secret is never accountable.
Where extraordinary powers are invoked in times of perceived crisis,
they should be of limited duration, renewable only by full
reconsideration and re-enactment by Parliament.

¶5
Such principles provide the motivating spirit of law. They find expression in legal
writings, judicial decisions, parliamentary practice, and constitutional documents. They
are the essence of the Rule of Law, "an unqualified human good." [See Note 12 below]

Note 12: The description of the rule of law as an "unqualified human good" is drawn from E. P.
Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1975) at 266.
David Neal's work The Rule of Law in a Penal Colony: Law and Power in Early New South Wales remains
an excellent survey of the various understandings of a concept that, at a minimum, stands for the idea of
law holding power accountable (Sydney: Cambridge University Press, 1991). Recognition of the sobering
gap between constitutional values and past state practice serves to remind us of the fragility of liberal
democracy, but should never foster an immobilizing cynicism of the sort that would jettison constitutional
aspiration along with naïveté.

¶6

Canadian anti-terrorism legislation fails on all counts.

¶7
This curtailment of constitutional principles would be serious enough if these were
short-term measures. In ordinary wars, temporary state intrusion is tolerated precisely
because hope remains for an eventual return to constitutional normalcy. The War on
Terror, however, is not a real war. Its parameters are unclear, ranging from gunboat
diplomacy to more or less gratuitous rights violations at home. Linguistic slippage
threatens clarity of thought as the metaphor of war glosses over a great deal. Unlike the
war against the Nazis, unlike even Vietnam, this war involves neither a fixed enemy nor
an identifiable objective. There are no criteria by which to declare victory or recognize
defeat. Closer to the War on Drugs than to "hot" warfare as such, we find ourselves
confronting an endless state of emergency that ensures the "permanence of the
temporary." [See Note 13 below] When the state intrudes on fundamental liberties,
"temporary" tends to permanence as surely as night follows day. [See Note 14 below]

Note 13: David Dyzenhaus, "The Permanence of the Temporary: Can Emergency Powers be
Normalized?" in Ronald J. Daniels, Patrick Macklem & Kent Roach, eds., The Security of Freedom: Essays
on Canada's Anti-Terrorism Bill (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001) 21.
Note 14: The Anti-Terrorism Act itself was passed as permanent law. "Sunset" is provided only for those
portions of the Act allowing for preventive arrest and investigative hearings, representing only a tiny
fragment of the whole.

III. CANADA'S ANTI-TERRORISM REGIME: GYPSY MOTHS AND WORMS
¶8
The Anti-Terrorist Act's provisions for preventive detention, [See Note 15 below]
compelled testimony before "investigative hearings," [See Note 16 below] and greatly
enhanced powers of government provoked sustained criticism on the ground that these
draconian measures violated Canadian values. A Senate committee cautioned that "Bill
C-36 gives powers that if abused by the executive or security establishments of this
country could have severe implications for democracy in Canada." [See Note 17 below]
It is important to recall the salutary warning, uttered in a slightly different context, that
"[i]t is an outstanding feature of every sedition act that the way it is enforced differs from
the way it looks in print as much as a gypsy moth differs from the worm from which it
has grown." [See Note 18 below]

Note 15: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 83.3.
Note 16: Supra note 15, s. 83.28.
Note 17: Canada, Special Senate Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, "Report of the
Committee" (1 November 2001) at A(II) online: Canada's Parliament
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/com-e/ sm36-e/rep-e/rep01oct01-e.htm (date accessed:
29 June 2003).

Note 18: Zechariah Chafee, Free Speech in the United States (Cambridge: Harvard University Press:
1941) 459 cited in L. W. Maher, "The Use and Abuse of Sedition" (1992) 14 Sydney L. Rev. 287 at 287.

¶9
Canada's definition of terrorism leaves much room for confusion of moths and
worms. Section 83.01 of the Criminal Code defines both "terrorist activity" and "terrorist
group." The definition of terrorism is in two parts, incorporating a number of specific
offences set out in various international conventions or protocols as well as providing a
more general definition. The general definition of terrorism involves an act or omission
motivated in whole or part by a "political, religious or ideological" purpose [See Note 19
below] with the primary intention ("in whole or in part") of either intimidating part of the
public regarding security or economic security, or compelling any government, "person,"
or organization inside or outside Canada to do or not do "any act." This act must be
accompanied by one of five secondary intentions: causing death or serious bodily harm
to a person by the use of violence, endangering a person's life, causing serious risk to
public health or safety, causing substantial property damage of a sort likely to result in
serious bodily harm, risk to life or public health or safety, or causing serious interference
with any essential "service, facility or system" other than disruption resulting from
advocacy, protest, dissent, or work stoppage that is not intended to result in harm or
threat to life, body, health, or safety of the public.

Note 19: Supra note 15, s. 83.01(1)(b)(i)(A).

¶ 10
Furthermore, the offence of terrorism includes conspiracy, attempt, threat,
counseling, [See Note 20 below] and "accessory after the fact" in relation to the
designated acts or omissions. [See Note 21 below] At first glance, this appears
complicated. More careful investigation reveals it to be nonsensical.

Note 20: "Counsel," under the Criminal Code, s. 22(3) includes procuring, soliciting or inciting (supra
note 15). According to the Canadian Encyclopaedic Digest (Ontario) 3d ed., vol. 7A (Toronto: Carswell,
1996) at s. 729, "in order to qualify as 'counselling', the acts or words of the accused must be likely to push
or incite, and be done or said with a view towards pushing or inciting, another to commit an offence."
Note 21: Supra note 15, s. 83.01(b).

¶ 11
Take, for example, the protection of even unlawful "advocacy," "protest,"
"dissent," and "work stoppage." This protection sits uneasily with the inclusion of
"political, religious or ideological" [See Note 22 below] motivation in the definition of
terrorism because advocacy, protest, dissent, and work stoppage are typically motivated

in whole or in part by political, religious, or ideological commitment. The "saving"
directly contradicts the "motivation" element.

Note 22: Ibid., s. 83.01(b)(i)(A).

¶ 12
Even the seemingly simple question of determining whether someone has the
"intent" to threaten life, body, health, safety, or essential services is left unclear. If such
an objective must be the sole objective or purpose in order to meet the intention required
then only the most bloodthirsty of killers would be a terrorist. When the Front de
Libération du Québec sought to destroy symbols of the Canadian state by placing bombs
in mailboxes, they did not necessarily seek to kill postal workers. If, however,
recklessness as to a mere possibility suffices, the terrorist net is cast very wide. All large
demonstrations interfere with essential services by disrupting traffic flow. In such
circumstances, it is entirely foreseeable that members of the public may suffer if fire
fighters, ambulances, or police services are unable to do their work. If the intent required
to be a terrorist is only some knowledge that some threat to safety might develop as one
possible outcome of one's actions, many demonstrators would become terrorists despite
the "saving" clause.
¶ 13
The Government of Canada has offered assurances that we need not fear such
possibilities, explaining that
... [P]rotest activity that intentionally causes serious disruption of essential
services or infrastructure, even if it is unlawful, would not be characterized
as a terrorist activity unless it also intentionally causes death or serious
harm to people. ... Terrorist activity would not include acts of civil
disobedience or labour actions, even if they were unlawful, such as acts
that resulted in some property damage. [See Note 23 below]
Note 23: Department of Justice, Backgrounder, "Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism Act" (20 November
2001) online: http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27904.html (date accessed: 29 June 2003).

¶ 14
This assurance is disingenuous. A person cannot "intend" to seriously disrupt
essential services without also "intending" to some extent the obvious natural
consequence that members of the public who depend on those services might be seriously
hurt. One hopes that the courts will find that there is a protected place of political dissent,
but it is not created in the words of this appallingly drafted statute.
¶ 15
Just as the boundary between dissent and terrorism is unclear, so too the
legislation confuses more or less ordinarily thuggish, violent behaviour with terrorism.

As John Russell notes, violent protesters, eco-terrorists who spike trees with the intent of
injuring loggers, and animal rights activists who poison Christmas turkeys all fall within
the statutory definition of terrorists. They threaten "serious bodily harm in order to
achieve political objectives." Violent individuals deserve little sympathy, but counting
them as "terrorists"
... needlessly multiplies the number of terrorists on the ground in Canada.
Among other things, this would distract from our efforts to detect and
bring to justice the real terrorists. It will inevitably place the activities of
legitimate protest groups under extraordinary, close government scrutiny.
This is bound to have a chilling effect on those groups' activities and raise
questions about the legitimacy of the campaign against terror. [See Note 24
below]
Note 24: British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, News Release, "Distinguishing Terrorism from
Other Types of Political Violence" (29 November 2001) online:
http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/01terrordefbroad.html (date accessed: 29 June 2003).

¶ 16
Here too we can see worms becoming confused with gypsy moths. The statute
threatens to "chill" the activities of entirely legitimate protest groups [See Note 25 below]
that are accepted as more or less natural parts of our political and cultural landscape and
whose activities - however inconvenient - we cherish as the mark of our liberty. A section
intended to alleviate concern about such matters does not help.

Note 25: This has certainly been the pattern in the past. See, for example, Steve Hewitt, Spying 101: the
RCMP's Secret Activities at Canadian Universities, 1917-1997 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
2002).

¶ 17
For greater certainty, the expression of a political, religious, or ideological
thought, belief, or opinion does not come within paragraph (b) of the definition "terrorist
activity" in subsection (1) unless it constitutes an act or omission that satisfies the criteria
of that paragraph. [See Note 26 below] This transparently useless addition does nothing
to atone for the pervasively poor drafting of the Act.

Note 26: Supra note 15, s. 83.01(1.1).

IV. EXTRA-JURISDICTIONAL REACH
¶ 18
Poor drafting or conceptual incoherence apart, relatively few problems would
arise if terrorism were defined simply as the use of violence or threat of violence in an
attempt to coerce the Canadian government. Similarly, long-standing Canadian allies
such as the countries of the European Community or the United States, for example,
might be presumed to enjoy a degree of legitimacy that precludes Canadian approval of
the use of deadly force against them. A definition of terrorism that specifically prohibited
the use of violence to coerce named countries or their citizens would be both clear and
defensible.
¶ 19
The new terrorism offences are not so defined, purporting instead to prohibit all
acts or omissions committed "in or outside Canada" with the intent of "compelling a
person, a government or a domestic or an international organization to do or to refrain
from doing any act ... ." [See Note 27 below] In the result, "counseling" someone to do
(or not do) something that threatens the "economic security" of someone so as to compel
"a government" is a terrorist offence. The only further required element is that there be
some risk to health or safety to a portion of the public outside Canada. It would be no
defence to show that the particular government really is reprehensible or that it ought to
be compelled, intimidated, or overthrown for the benefit of either its own citizens or
others who might fall victim to its power. Though some have argued that Canadians
should "not be barred from subsidizing the use of force against dictatorships in other
countries," [See Note 28 below] the statute allows for no distinction between liberation
armies and terrorists. On its face, it accords the most brutal of dictatorships the same
"anti-terrorist" protection as Canada itself.

Note 27: Supra note 15, s. 83.01(1)(b). Other provisions "deem" specified acts or omissions committed
outside of the country to have been committed in Canada if either the act of terrorism is directed in some
way against Canada, or if the perpetrator fits certain criteria of connection to Canada.
Note 28: Canadian Civil Liberties Association, News Release, "Does the Anti-Terror Bill Go Too Far?"
(December 2001) online: http://www.ccla.org/news/01-12_anti-terror.shtml (date accessed: 29 June 2003).

¶ 20
Matters become more complicated still when we recognize that Canada is not a
pacifist country. Thus, use of arms in accordance with international law is excluded from
the definition of terrorism. [See Note 29 below] Confusingly, however, a good deal of
armed conflict and some state military activity takes place in ways that are not condoned
by international law, and this includes acts of violence approved by Canada or its allies.
[See Note 30 below] Canada rarely objects when our closest allies foment armed
resistance (terrorism) in other places. Under the Anti-Terrorism Act, however, Canadians
who supported dissidents within Iraq prior to the 2003 U.S. invasion, for example, would
have been acting in contravention of our anti-terrorism laws, even if they did so by aiding

U.S. officials. It is inconceivable, of course, that Canadian foreign policy would wish
such a result. [See Note 31 below]

Note 29: Supra note 15, s. 83.01(1)(b).
Note 30: The status of the U.S.-led attack on Iraq under international law is unclear. See Ikechi Mgbeoji,
"Prophylactic Use of Force in International Law: The Illegitimacy of Canada's Participation in 'Coalitions
of the Willing' Without UN Authorization and Parliamentary Sanction" (2003) 8(2) Rev. Const. Stud.
[forthcoming] and Thomas Walkom, "Attack on Iraq could turn Bush into criminal" The Toronto Star (18
March 2003) A25 (quoting legal expert Ted McWhinney).
Note 31: The parallel universe of refugee and immigration law illustrates the real world complexities in
this area. Although Israel is a country with which Canada has long-standing cordial relations, the Refugee
Protection Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, on the urging of a Federal
Government lawyer, ruled in W.D.U. (Re) [2002], R.P.D.D. No. 167 No. MA1-01203 (IRB) at para. 35,
that a man who had worked for Israel's secret intelligence agency was ineligible for refugee status because
of being complicit "in crimes against humanity committed by Israel." Conversely, in Fuentes v. Canada
(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2003] FCT 379 at para. 47, Lemieux J. held that Rogelio
Cuevas Fuentes was potentially eligible for refugee status, despite past violence against the Mexican
government undertaken as a "guerilla" rather than as a "terrorist."

¶ 21
Because it fails to address such real world complexities, a fundamental
dishonesty underlies the Anti-Terrorism Act. The law can never mean what it seems to
say. We cannot indefinitely avoid distinguishing terrorists from freedom fighters and,
having failed to do so explicitly in the legislation, the same result must be achieved
surreptitiously. A modern-day Norman Bethune, the Canadian hero of the Spanish Civil
War and of the Chinese Revolution, appears through one lens as a great humanitarian,
through another as a terrorist. He is in good company, as Member of Parliament Lorne
Nystrom pointed out:
... [T]he British considered Menachem Begin to be a terrorist. He was a
freedom fighter to many of the Israeli people. Nelson Mandela ... a
tremendous freedom fighter in my opinion, was considered by some people
... to be a terrorist. ... The American revolution was an act of terrorism for
some; an act of freedom and liberation for others. [See Note 32 below]
Note 32: House of Commons Debates, 058 (12 February 2003) at 1550 (Hon. Lorne Nystrom) online:
Canada's Parliament http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/2/parlbus/chambus/house/debates/058_2 003-0212/han058_1550-E.htm (date accessed: 29 June 2003). Compare with Anne McIlroy, "Citizen bane" The
Guardian (11 June 2001) online: http://www.guardian.co.uk/elsewhere/
journalist/story/0,7792,505086,00.html (date accessed: 29 June 2003) (reporting Member of Parliament
Rob Anders' objections to honouring Mandela because of his terrorist past).

¶ 22
Canada's one-size-fits-all definition of terrorist embraces anti-Castro activists in
Cuba (or Florida), Kurdish resistance to Saddam Hussein, "groups fighting for democracy
in Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Chile," Louis Riel, Mahatma Gandhi, the
Intifada, and George Washington. [See Note 33 below]

Note 33: Compare with September 11, supra note 4 at 58-62.

V. TERRORIST GROUPS
¶ 23
One poorly drafted definition piles atop others as definitions of "terrorist groups"
are constructed on top of the definitions of terrorism. A "terrorist group" is an entity
whose purposes or activities include carrying out or facilitating any terrorist activity or an
entity "listed" by the Governor in Council on the advice of the Solicitor General. [See
Note 34 below] Because the definition of a terrorist activity is imprecise, so too is the
definition of a terrorist group. One definition is built upon the other.

Note 34: Supra note 15, ss. 83.01, 83.05.

¶ 24
The category of "terrorist group" is larger than it otherwise might be because of
the inclusion of groups whose purpose, in part, is to facilitate, contribute to, or participate
("directly or indirectly") in a "terrorist" activity or a "terrorist group." "Facilitating,"
"participating in," or "contributing to" are, in turn, surprisingly broad concepts. [See Note
35 below] Under section 83.18(1) of the Criminal Code, "Every one who knowingly
participates in or contributes to, directly or indirectly, any activity of a terrorist group for
the purpose of enhancing the ability of any terrorist group to facilitate or carry out a
terrorist activity is guilty of an indictable offence ... ."

Note 35: Ibid., s. 83.01(1.1) specifies that facilitation is to be construed in accordance with s.83.19(2).

¶ 25
This offence may be committed even where no terrorist activity is actually
facilitated or carried out. It is irrelevant that the individual's contribution or participation
may not have actually enhanced the ability of the group in any way and, indeed,
irrelevant that the accused may not have known of the specific nature of any terrorist
activity the group may have been involved in. Participation or contribution may involve
as little as "offering to provide a skill or an expertise," "remaining in any country ... in

association with a terrorist group," or making oneself available to facilitate a terrorist
offence. Evidence of involvement in terrorist groups can be found in association with
persons involved in a terrorist group, receipt of "any benefit" from such persons, repeated
engagement "in activities at the instruction of" members of a terrorist group, or use of "a
name, word, symbol or other representation." [See Note 36 below] Facilitation of a
terrorist activity is prohibited by section 83.19 of the Criminal Code:
83.19 (1) Every one who knowingly facilitates a terrorist activity is guilty
of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not
exceeding fourteen years.
(2)

For the purposes of this Part, a terrorist activity is facilitated whether
or not
(a)
(b)
(c)

the facilitator knows that a particular terrorist activity is
facilitated;
any particular terrorist activity was foreseen or planned at the
time it was facilitated; or
any terrorist activity was actually carried out.

Note 36: Ibid., s. 83.18(2)(3)(4).

¶ 26
Bizarrely, knowing facilitation can happen even though no terrorist activity was
in fact carried out, where the "facilitator" does not know "that a particular activity is
facilitated," and where no particular terrorist activity was foreseen or planned at the time
it was facilitated. [See Note 37 below] This is grammatical, if not legal, nonsense
inasmuch as there is no "it" capable of being "knowingly" facilitated if nothing is
foreseen or planned. Nonsense or not, a very real fourteen-year sentence of imprisonment
attaches to the offence. [See Note 38 below]

Note 37: Ibid., s. 83.19(2).
Note 38: The Department of Justice's Fact Sheet, "Strengthening the Safeguards With Amendments to the
Proposed Anti-Terrorism Act" (20 November 2001) online:
http://canada.justice.gc.ca/en/news/nr/2001/doc_27906.html (date accessed: 30 June 2003) [emphasis in
original], papered over the difficulties: "The provisions concerning facilitation of a terrorist activity ...
clearly state that, in order to be guilty of an offence, an individual must know or intend that his or her act
would help a terrorist activity to occur, even if the details of the activity are not known by the individual."
The Act lacks the clarity of the explanation.

VI. THE HOUSE OF MIRRORS: AL QAEDA, ROTARIANS, AND
CHRISTIAN AID

¶ 27
Like images in a House of Mirrors, "terrorists" appear in a series of reflections,
each more distant than the one before. One section reflects another, continuing in infinite
regression.
¶ 28
Imagine, for example, the precarious situation of a guest speaker from a human
rights non-governmental organization (NGO) who encourages Rotarians to divest from
"Mortland," in the expectation that the resulting economic hardship will force that
country's repressive government to abandon long-standing human rights violations. Her
organization might also support church groups providing humanitarian aid to rural
villagers who, in turn, might sometimes support anti-government guerillas. Promotion of
a "boycott" or "divestment" campaign amounts to "counselling" an act (divestment) for
political purposes in the hope of disrupting "economic security" so as to compel "a
government" to change its conduct. Such campaigns endanger health or safety and disrupt
essential services in direct proportion to their success. The church group too is involved
in activities that in part support terrorist activity. Canadian law forgives neither the
church group nor the human rights organization simply because they disavow armed
struggle. Both are tainted by "terrorist" activity. As image after image is reflected, the
Rotary Club itself is caught because it facilitated the presentation. Participation in Rotary
in turn becomes a crime. Terrorists, all.
¶ 29
This scenario, of course, is nonsense, reductio ad absurdum at its worst. It is hard
to imagine Rotarians being prosecuted in such circumstances. If commenced, the
prosecution could never succeed. It feels wrong. Though the question of where the police
or the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) will cast their net of surveillance is
a different matter, one suspects that even here the Rotary Club at least might fare
reasonably well. Somewhere on the slippery slope between Al Qaeda and Rotary there is
an invisible line.
¶ 30
That such concerns are not entirely academic is shown by the response of a
number of Canadian "civil society" groups representing Aboriginal groups, labour
organizations, and ethnic communities, amongst others, who expressed their concerns
during hearings on the Anti-Terrorism Act. Most feared the criminalization of entirely
legitimate activities, and the exposure of their members to improper surveillance,
questioning, harassment, or criminal charges. [See Note 39 below] The Evangelical
Fellowship of Canada's (EFC) brief to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human
Rights provides a telling example. This umbrella group of "32 evangelical, Protestant
denominations and over 100 Christian organizations" includes "churches and relief and
development organizations that are involved in religious and humanitarian work around
the world." [See Note 40 below] The EFC feared that the Bill could "put a chill on
Canadian charities providing assistance where it is most needed, in conflict-ridden
situations." [See Note 41 below]

Note 39: September 11, supra note 4 at 58-64.

Note 40: Evangelical Fellowship of Canada, "Submission to the Standing Committee on Justice and
Human Rights on Bill C-36, An Act in Order to Combat Terrorism" (8 November 2001) online:
http://www.evangelicalfellowship.ca/pdf/ Anti-Terrorism%20Bill%20C-36.pdf (date accessed: 30 June
2003) at 1.
Note 41: Ibid. at 2.

¶ 31
Resources are one issue. The distinction between "good guys" and "bad guys" is
not always clear, and charities lack the intelligence capabilities required to ensure that
none of their "resources would assist someone who could be considered an insurgent or
terrorist." Consequently, the EFC worried about a number of matters: "Would providing
humanitarian assistance to communities that contain or are associated with terrorists be
caught within the scope of the legislation?" Might a Canadian charity providing
"financing or resources to a group ... [subsequently] determined [by Government] to be a
'terrorist group' ... face sanctions even though the entity was not considered a 'terrorist
group' at the time"? [See Note 42 below]

Note 42: Ibid. at 3.

¶ 32
Noting that foreign governments often dislike Christian charities and human
rights groups, the EFC feared "false or misleading evidence" being provided secretly and
used against it in Canada. The result would make the Canadian state the agent of "foreign
governments" in pursuit of "religious, political and ideological purposes against Canadian
people or organizations ... ." [See Note 43 below]

Note 43: Ibid. at 4.

¶ 33
Although such situations could arise innocently, in the ordinary sense of that
word, there have also been times when evangelical groups have deliberately provided aid
knowing full well that doing so facilitated terrorism.
1)

In the 1980s there was a UNHCR refugee camp in Thailand and on
the border of Cambodia, the home of some 30,000 Khmer Rouge
refugees. Some of the men from the refugee camp would, from time
to time, clandestinely conduct raids into Cambodia. Two
organizations, one religious the other not, were contracted to provide
medical aid and food to the refugees.

2)

Another Christian organization provides medical and dental care ...
in a region controlled by outlawed militia groups. The clinics
function with the permission of the militia who may from time to
time avail themselves of medical and dental services offered to
anyone who asks for assistance. [See Note 44 below]

Note 44: Ibid. at 1.

¶ 34
past.

In short, EFC-affiliated organizations have deliberately aided terrorists in the

¶ 35
It is apparent that the boundaries between humanitarian and terrorist activity are
imprecise. We can presume that evangelicals do not generally support terrorism. It is
their humanitarian urges that are the problem. Their example also serves to illustrate the
dangers inherent in defining offences by reference to political, religious, or ideological
motivations for the EFC explicitly acknowledges its colourable motivations: "Christians
have Biblical instruction to love and care for their enemies, not just their friends (Matt.
5:44). This means that humanitarian assistance can be provided to those engaged in
military conflict, terrorism or gross human rights violations." [See Note 45 below]

Note 45: Supra note 40 at 1. In "Matthew 5:44 :: 21st Century King James Version (KJ21)," online:
BibleGateway.com http://www.biblegateway.com/cgi-bin/bible?language=
english&passage=Matthew+5%3A44&version=KJ21 (date accessed: 31 July 2003), the Bible says to "...
Love your enemies, bless them that curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which
despitefully use you, and persecute you."

¶ 36
In short, EFC-affiliated organizations fully intend to aid terrorists in the future.
They will do so because God orders it. Their religious motivation, rendered suspect under
the Criminal Code, is a constitutionally protected value. But if freedom of religion might
justify providing humanitarian aid to "our enemies," so too the freedom of conscience for
those who aid evildoers only because of secular humanitarian motivations must be
respected.
VII. UMPIRE'S DISCRETION
¶ 37
The obvious objection to these concerns is that they are based on a statutory
reading insufficiently leavened by pragmatism, that they rest too much on a literal,
overly-legalistic approach to the statute. This is a valid objection.

¶ 38
Despite the plausibility of the argument presented by the EFC in its brief, neither
it nor its affiliated organizations are likely to suffer penal consequence under these laws.
It seems highly unlikely that any Canadian security official or Attorney General would
wish to prosecute evangelicals for engaging in "good works." CSIS will not wish to spy
on them. Ministers will not wish to "list" them; financial institutions will not report their
activities to the authorities; their assets will not be frozen, their members will not be
imprisoned. If this intuition is correct, groups such as the Apostolic Church of the
Pentecost and the Foursquare Gospel Church have little to fear from the anti-terrorism
laws. Various evangelical educational organizations and associated charities, including
the likes of Arab World Ministries, Focus on the Family, and World Vision would also be
"safe." Such organizations will not be treated as terrorists despite the EFC's admission
that its member organizations have aided terrorists in the past, and its declared intent to
do so in the future.
¶ 39
But the fact that we are confident that certain groups would not be considered to
be terrorist, should not reassure us.
¶ 40
No invisible "bubble zone" protects other kinds of religious or charitable groups.
On the contrary, some are rendered suspect simply because of who they are. Muslim,
Sikh, or Hindu organizations cannot assume equal status before the law with evangelical
groups. The reductio ad absurdum presented earlier makes this clear. Disconcertingly, we
leave the realm of the absurd with astonishing ease if "Mortland" becomes Israel, "rural
Mortland" becomes the occupied territories, "church groups" become Islamic
organizations, and the human rights group is tied to either the anti-globalization or
decolonization movements.
¶ 41
The difference is not legal, but sociological and political. The terrorist offences
are defined so broadly as to encompass almost everyone and they are given meaning only
in application. But in such a case, law has given way to expediency. The invitation to
read a statute pragmatically amounts to an invitation to place unquestioning trust in the
discretion (a polite term denoting biases, gut instincts, upbringing, and socialization) of
officialdom. This approach is an affront both to the very idea of public governance by
law and to the underpinnings of liberal democracy. It will be police and bureaucrats, not
Supreme Court justices, who will give these laws concrete meaning. [See Note 46 below]
The collateral damage done by misdirected anti-terrorist fire will register as irreparable
harm to innocent people.

Note 46: Letter from John Dixon, President, British Columbia Civil Liberties Association to Rt. Hon.
Jean Chretien, Prime Minister of Canada, (22 November 2001) online:
http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/01c36openletter.html (date accessed: 30 June 2003).

¶ 42
Disturbingly, all of Canada's anti-terrorism law turns on official discretion.
Despite many complex definitions, qualifications, subordinate clauses, nuance, and subtle

layering, the Anti-Terrorism Act comes down to the conferral of massive, ill-defined
powers on police officers and the executive branch of government. Prohibitions on
dealing with terrorist assets can be waived by "the Solicitor General of Canada" or his or
her designate, [See Note 47 below] while investigative hearings and preventive arrest
require the "consent of the Attorney General." [See Note 48 below] Similarly,
prosecutions under the Security of Information Act require the consent of the federal
Attorney General, [See Note 49 below] while the Solicitor General (in concert with the
Minister of National Revenue) may issue "certificates" effectively stripping organizations
of their charitable status. [See Note 50 below] Capping it all, terrorist entities are so
designated by the Governor in Council, [See Note 51 below] while "[p]roceedings in
respect of a terrorism offence or an offence under section 83.12" require the consent of
the Attorney General. [See Note 52 below]

Note 47: Supra note 15, s. 83.09.
Note 48: Ibid., ss. 83.28, 83.3.
Note 49: Security of Information Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. O-5, s. 24.
Note 50: Charities Registration (Security Information) Act, s. 4 being Part 6, s. 113 of the Anti-Terrorism
Act, S.C. 2001, c. 41.
Note 51: Supra note 15, s. 83.05
Note 52: Ibid., s. 83.24. Section 83.12 deals with the freezing of terrorist group property. Under section 2,
a "terrorism offence" is defined as an offence under any of sections 83.02 (financing terrorism), 83.04
(using or possessing property for terrorist purposes), or 83.18-23 (participating, facilitating, instructing, or
harbouring terrorist groups; facilitating terrorist activity; committing an indictable offence for or with a
terrorist group; instructing someone to carry out an activity for a terrorist group, or to carry out a terrorist
activity; harbouring, or concealing a person in relation to terrorism).

¶ 43
The head of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), the federal Solicitor
General, and the Attorney General of Canada have each acknowledged that the Act turns
on official discretion. Asked by Senator Karen Fraser to explain the "reasonable grounds"
that might justify the use of preventive detention, RCMP Commissioner Zaccardelli
responded:
... Obviously, what you have just described is a lower threshold than what
we are normally used to seeing in this country. ... We are in active
discussions about what this means because the devil is in the detail, as we
know. It is easy to read, but it is how we apply and how we interpret this
which will determine how this really works.
We are in active discussions with our lawyers and with lawyers from the
Department of Justice to determine what this means. ... [You] take [our]

best information and [our] best intelligence and make that determination.
That is how our system works. It puts into the hands of the police officer
the authority to exercise that, but it has to be exercised on solid basis. [See
Note 53 below]
Note 53: Canada, Senate, The Special Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, "Issue 2 - Evidence
(afternoon sitting)" (23 October 2001) online: Canada's Parliament
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/ sm36-e/02evbe.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&comm_id=90 (date accessed: 30 June 2003) [emphasis added].

¶ 44
The Act, in other words, provides no useful guidance whatsoever. The RCMP
Commissioner's response amounts to an astonishing admission of the extent to which
citizens' rights rest on official discretion.
¶ 45
Moreover, the Solicitor General made a similar admission regarding the "listing"
of terrorist entities:
Senator Lynch-Staunton: Reading the definition of terrorist activity, it
certainly goes way beyond some of the activities, in particular the one
climaxing on September 11. It can also be applied to strictly domestic
activities.
... What I am trying to get from you, minister, is how far in Canadian
society does the net of the definition of terrorist activity extend? Right
now, this proposed legislation is the result of a terrible event. However, the
way it is written and drafted it goes way beyond those who cause that event
or their sympathizers, to my mind. I should like to know whether you share
that view or not.
Mr. MacAulay: Senator, I would like to say that in this situation it is not
who you are, it is what you have done. If you have done something in
order that in my evaluation you should be listed as a terrorist organization
or individual, then an Order in Council approves that recommendation
from me and then they are listed. [See Note 54 below]
Note 54: Canada, Senate, The Special Committee on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, "Issue 1 - Evidence
(afternoon sitting)" (22 October 2001) online: Canada's Parliament
http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/Com-e/ sm36-e/01evce.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&comm_id=90 (date accessed: 30 June 2003) [emphasis added].

¶ 46
Curiously, the Minister's response when questioned about the legislation's
indeterminate language was that he would decide its meaning: discretion substitutes for
law. This admission might be dismissed as a minister's misstatement were it not for the
fact that Attorney General Anne McLellan sang the same song in scolding The Globe and

Mail for saying the Anti-Terrorism bill would "strip Canadians of civil liberties."
Proudly, albeit illogically, she pointed to the requirement for "the consent of the Attorney
General" before unpleasant things could happen. [See Note 55 below]

Note 55: Anne McLellan, Minister of Justice "Antiterrorism act" The Globe and Mail (25 October 2001)
A18. See also the testimony of Justice Minister Anne McLellan with respect to the Attorney General's
discretion regarding preventive arrest and investigative hearings, Canada, Senate, The Special Committee
on the Subject Matter of Bill C-36, "Issue 1 - Evidence (morning sitting)" (22 October 2001) online:
Canada's Parliament http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/commbus/senate/ Com-e/sm36-e/01evbe.htm?Language=E&Parl=37&Ses=1&comm_id=90 (date accessed: 30 June 2003).

¶ 47
Such statements are not very reassuring. The Rule of Law requires clarity in
penal prohibitions for, without clarity, the rights of anyone to go about business
unhindered by the state rests entirely on the discretion of police officers, prosecutors,
bureaucrats, and politicians. Vague statutory language is rendered concrete only in police
action backstopped by ministerial case-to-case political judgment. "The devil," as the
RCMP Commissioner said, "is in the detail." The only decisions that matter will be made
behind closed doors, without announced standards (this the Solicitor General made clear),
secretly, politically, and without realistic possibility of either judicial review or public
accountability.
¶ 48
We should not, however, confer powers on individuals because we trust them.
This is not because we have reason to distrust the particular individuals who hold office,
but because experience shows that power corrupts and absolute power (the kind "trust"
seeks) corrupts absolutely. When a sort of "umpire's discretion" takes the place of rules,
the Rule of Law is lost entirely. [See Note 56 below] Any statutory scheme constructed
on such principles should fail judicial review as both overbroad and unconstitutionally
vague. [See Note 57 below]

Note 56: See: Lon L. Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964).
Note 57: See: Marc Ribeiro, Limiting Arbitrary Power: The Vagueness Principle in Canadian
Constitutional Law (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004) [forthcoming in 2004].

¶ 49
Neither Parliament nor the court can ameliorate the effects of bad legislation once
it is on the books. Parliament is a paper tiger [See Note 58 below] while judicial review
comes too rarely, too little, too late, and in contexts in which habits of judicial deference
to executive power are strongly ingrained. Courtroom victory in any event is pyrrhic
because it cannot "put together ruined families, regain lost livelihoods, or rebuild

friendship and trust, which were fractured by the suspicion, innuendo and stigmatization
sown by the overly zealous acts of the State." [See Note 59 below]

Note 58: The Canadian system of government is notoriously closely directed by the Prime Minister:
Donald J. Savoie, Governing from the Centre: the Concentration of Power in Canadian Politics (Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 1999).
Note 59: Muslim Lawyer's Association, "Statement of the Coalition of Muslim Organizations on Bill C36 (Anti-Terrorism Act)" (Remarks to the Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights, 8 November
2001) cited in September 11, supra note 4 at 63.

VIII.

THE PUBLIC SAFETY ACT

¶ 50
Although strongly praised by a leading expert on anti-terrorism law, the Public
Safety Act, too is fundamentally flawed. Kent Roach praises the Bill for offering
practical responses to the threat of terrorism. It seeks to establish a "multi-department
approach to regulating materials that can be used for terrorism and sites that are
vulnerable to terrorist attacks... ." [See Note 60 below] Roach believes that, unlike the
Anti-Terrorism Act, such measures are likely to reduce opportunities for terrorism while
"providing less of a threat to liberty, privacy, and equality than the criminal law." [See
Note 61 below]

Note 60: Ibid. at 176.
Note 61: Ibid.

¶ 51
This depiction is too sanguine. The Bill operates by giving ministers huge,
unchecked, powers. Discretion and secret decisions permeate the entire legislation.
Parliament is shunted aside as "[i]nterim orders, emergency measures and security
measures across a wide area of federal jurisdiction are to be implemented on Ministerial
discretion, largely without review and largely without consultation. Most of these
measures can be delegated to officials ... further reducing accountability for what is being
done." [See Note 62 below] Such a scheme weakens the chain of shared cabinet
responsibility, which is a cornerstone of responsible government. The Globe and Mail's
assessment of the Act's first incarnation remains accurate:
The government refers to its proposed Public Safety Act as legislation, but
it might as easily call it a blank cheque. Whenever their inspiration flags,
the authors leave it to individual ministers to do whatever they feel is
necessary whenever they feel they must. ... [T]he bill reads as though

someone had peppered the draft text with Post-It notes: Insert greater
ministerial powers here. [See Note 63 below]
Note 62: British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, News Release, "Written Submissions To The
House Of Commons Legislative Committee On Bill C-17" (30 January 2003) online:
http://www.bccla.org/othercontent/03publicsafety.html (date accessed: 30 June 2003) (Recommendation
#2).
Note 63: "The Public Safety Act seeks too much power..." Editorial, The Globe and Mail (24 November
2001) A24.

¶ 52
Despite laudable objectives, the approach of the Public Safety Act is profoundly
misguided. [See Note 64 below]

Note 64: See also Canadian Bar Association, "Submission on Bill C-17: Public Safety Act, 2002"
(January 2003) online: http://www.cba.org/cba/pdf/c%2D17%2Deng.pdf (date accessed: 30 June 2003).

IX. ARE OFFENSIVE MEASURES JUSTIFIABLE?
¶ 53
It is obvious that the legislative response to 9/11 has the potential to profoundly
encroach upon civil liberties. Despite this, it is possible to support this legislation. People
who do so claim that no harm will be done to the innocent, that extraordinary measures
are called for in extraordinary times, or that overweening police powers are acceptable
because they are lesser than the evil of terrorism.
¶ 54
During debate on the Anti-Terrorism Act, the concept of "human security" was
massaged first into a human right and then into a political trump card. Liberal Member of
Parliament Irwin Cotler described Canada's Anti-Terrorism Act as
... human security legislation, which seeks to protect both national security
... and civil liberties. As the United Nations puts it, terrorism constitutes a
fundamental assault on human rights ... while counter-terrorism law
involves a protection of the most fundamental of rights, the right to life,
liberty, and the security of the person, as well as the collective right of
peace. [See Note 65 below]
Note 65: Irwin Cotler, "Thinking Outside the Box: Foundational Principles for a Counter-Terrorism Law
and Policy" in supra note 13, 111 at 112-13.

¶ 55
So viewed, "security" could be "balanced" in the mix of other human rights. But
security always wins.
¶ 56
Though security from bombers and hijackers is certainly a good thing, it is
curious to treat domestic spies, privacy invasion, and the unilateral exercise of state
power as human rights measures. No responsible person suggests that terrorist acts are to
be tolerated, and the relevant points of contention concern only the best means by which
to ensure security consistently with the overriding goal of preserving liberal democracy.
The "human security" rationale, bandied about loosely, served to cut off discussion at
precisely the point where reflection was most necessary.
¶ 57
In Canadian political discourse, seemingly offensive measures are rendered more
widely acceptable than might otherwise be the case if they are credibly said to be
consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. [See Note 66 below]
During debate on the Anti-Terrorism Act, the Charter was used effectively, though
misleadingly, as a pivot point for ministerial media spin. "Charter-proofing," however, is
a minimal attainment. [See Note 67 below] It confuses one piece of evidence regarding
fundamental constitutional principles (the Charter) for the whole [See Note 68 below]
and mistakes formal constitutional compliance with legislative wisdom. To predict a bill
will survive Charter scrutiny implies nothing about the ways police officers will use it,
nothing about the effectiveness of the bill in relation to its desired ends, and little about
its consonance with larger principles of constitutionalism. Focus on "Charter-proofing" is
a shell game which keeps public attention well away from "the action." [See Note 69
below]

Note 66: Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), c. 11.
[Charter].
Note 67: Compare with Philip Thomas, "September 11th and Good Governance" (2002) 53 N. Ir. Legal
Q. 366 ["Good Governance"], and Kent Roach, "The Dangers of a Charter-Proof and Crime-Based
Response to Terrorism" in The Security of Freedom, supra note 13, 131; September 11, supra note 4.
Note 68: In a particularly cynical move, the preamble to Canada, Bill C-36, An Act to amend the
Criminal Code, the Official Secrets Act, the Canada Evidence Act, the Proceeds of Crime (Money
Laundering) Act and other Acts, and to enact measures respecting the registration of charities, in order to
combat terrorism, 1st Sess., 37th Parl., 2001, Preamble (assented to 18 December 2001) online: Canada's
Parliament http://www.parl.gc.ca/37/1/parlbus/chambus/house/bills/ government/C-36/C36_3/90168bE.html (date accessed: 30 June 2003) stated that Canada "is committed to taking
comprehensive measures against terrorist activity while continuing to respect and promote the values
reflected in ... the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." Unlike the Emergencies Act, R.S.C.
1985 (4th Supp.), c. 22, there is no mention of the Canadian Bill of Rights (the Anti-Terrorism Act
operates through massive interference with property rights, which are protected under the Bill of Rights but
not the Charter).
Note 69: September 11, supra note 4 at 99.

¶ 58
A more honest defence for apparently draconian laws is found in the assumptions
that innocent people have nothing to fear, that only criminals seek privacy, that such
legislation does not hurt anyone, and that the authorities can be trusted. A peculiar
Canadian twist on this theme, uttered sotto voce, is the assumption that Canadian
authorities are less inclined to overreaction, gross violations of human rights, and racially
discriminatory law enforcement than their U.S. counterparts. This too is unhelpful and,
ultimately, highly misleading. There is little cause for smugness on the grounds that
others behave worse than we do. Moreover, to say that laws have not in fact been abused
says nothing about their potential for misuse. It amounts only to a restatement of the
"trust me" rationale. Acts conferring unprecedented powers lurk dangerously. Like
hidden mines, they are set to explode whenever wrong-headed individuals exercise
power. Bad laws can be used against us "in 10, 20 or even 50 years time ... by an
unscrupulous government." [See Note 70 below] They also inevitably establish a new
baseline from which increasingly draconian legislation will be launched when the next
terrible event occurs. [See Note 71 below] And terrible events are inevitable.

Note 70: George Williams, "Australian Values and the War Against Terrorism" (National Press Club
Telstra Australia Day Address, 29 January 2003) online: University of New South Wales Faculty of Law
http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/events/ AustraliaDayAddress-Terrorism.html (date accessed: 23 June 2003).
Note 71: Timothy Lynch, "Breaking the Vicious Cycle: Preserving Our Liberties While Fighting
Terrorism" (2002) 443 Pol'y Analysis online: CATO Institute http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa443.pdf
(date accessed: 30 June 2003); "Good Governance," supra note 67.

¶ 59
In any event, it is not true that "no harm" has been done. In one case, a Canadian
businessman was "listed" as a "terrorist entity" and arrested in the autumn of 2001. Liban
Hussein's assets were frozen, and he was subjected to extradition proceedings. Though it
was subsequently admitted that there was no evidence linking him to terrorism, Hussein
was ruined, losing "his business, his income, his job, and his prospects." In another, CSIS
"facilitated the transfer" of a Canadian citizen, Mansour Jabarah, to the United States,
[See Note 72 below] and in still another, the home of an animal rights activist was raided
on the theory that his activities amounted to terrorism. [See Note 73 below] More
broadly, privacy experts warn that the War on Terror threatens a fundamental
transformation of state-citizen relations in Canada. A report on the first year of the AntiTerrorist Act found "a serious erosion of civil rights, especially with regards to due
process and the right to privacy." [See Note 74 below] The inventory of abusive state
action includes criminalization of political dissent, [See Note 75 below] racial profiling,
[See Note 76 below] unnecessarily harsh treatment of refugees, [See Note 77 below] a
chilling of humanitarian work, [See Note 78 below] and violations of privacy rights. [See
Note 79 below]

Note 72: Alan Borovoy "Security's Serpentine Coils" The Globe and Mail (1 August 2002) A21.

Note 73: Thomas Walkom "War on terror being used as fig leaf" The Toronto Star (20 August 2001)
A19.
Note 74: See Canadian Bar Association, supra note 11, 3; Canadian Bar Association, News Release,
"CBA Calls Federal Government First Anniversary Report on Anti-Terrorism Act Inadequate" (14 May
2003) online: http://www.cba.org/CBA/News/ 2003_Releases/PrintHtml.asp?DocId=52473 (date accessed:
30 June 2003).
Note 75: Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 6-7. Examples included a raid on Native activists at Port
Alberni, British Columbia; an article in the RCMP Gazette, identifying environmental activists, amongst
others, as potential terrorists; a CSIS report identifying the anti-globalization movement as a threat to
security; and the seizure of U.S. anti-war videotapes by the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency.
Note 76: Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 7-9. Issues noted included police failures to respond to hate
crimes against Muslims; "hundreds" of cases where Arab and/or Muslim community leaders were threated
with "preventive detention" if they failed to provide "voluntary" interviews; Canada's failure to protest "the
disappearance, secret detention and deportation by American authorities of Maher Arar and a half dozen
other Canadian citizens of Arab or Islamic origin"; CSIS harassment of Arab university students including
threats of "deportation and revocation of their citizenship if they did not provide information about
community members"; the failure of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade to warn
Arab or Muslim Canadians against travel to the United States (where serious rights violations are
commonly suffered by members of this community); the Deputy Minister of Justice, Morris Rosenberg's,
refusal to disavow racial profiling.
Note 77: Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 9-10. Refugee claimants are now routinely detained upon
arrival at Pearson International Airport; those appearing at the Canada-U.S. border are turned back even in
circumstances where there is no guarantee they will be permitted to return for assessment of their refugee
claim.
Note 78: Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 10-11. NGOs are increasingly concerned that humanitarian
assistance is compromised in areas of conflict where it may be "impossible to avoid relating to all involved
combatants..."; "southern partners" find it increasingly difficult to obtain visas needed to attend meetings in
Canada; "programs in countries such as Lebanon or Colombia ... could be jeopardized by fear of potential
'proximity' with 'listed entities,' like Hezbollah or [the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia]"; "One
mainstream church-based NGO reported ... that its financial institution refused on two occasions to transfer
funds earmarked for humanitarian relief and reconstruction projects in Iraq."
Note 79: Canadian Bar Association, ibid. at 11-12. This includes moves toward transferring personal
information about Canadians to U.S. "security agencies unaccountable to [the] Canadian Parliament and the
Canadian public"; massive expansions of the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency's "Big Brother"
database; proposed Lawful Access legislation; and the proposal for a national identity card.

¶ 60
Even in light of all this, however, it remains possible that there may be no
alternative. Canada must join with other countries in the struggle against terrorism.
Unfortunately, there is little reason for confidence that the measures taken to date will be
effective in relation to the ends sought. The success of the 9/11 attackers resulted more
from failure of intelligence capacity than inadequacy in law. [See Note 80 below]
Canada's law-based response through "the Anti-Terrorism Act largely made criminal,
conduct that was already criminal before September 11, and most of its new investigative
powers and offences were not even used during the first year of the law's existence." [See

Note 81 below] Disturbingly too, the new legislation reveals little concern to balance
strong powers with civil rights protections despite the model provided in the Emergencies
Act, for example. [See Note 82 below]

Note 80: George Williams, "Why the ASIO bill is rotten to the core" The Age (27 August 2002) online:
www.theage.com.au/ articles/2002/08/26/1030053032903.html (date accessed: 30 June 2003).
Note 81: September 11, supra note 4 at 175. The most significant exception to this point is in the area of
financing terrorism. The Department of Justice Backgrounder on "Amendments to the Anti-Terrorism
Act," supra note 23, as much as admits the legislation to be largely symbolic: "Removing the notion of
political, religious or ideological motivation would transform the definition from one that is designed to
recognize and deal strongly with terrorism to one that is not distinguishable from a general law
enforcement provision in the Criminal Code."
Note 82: Supra note 68.

¶ 61
Worse, while there have been violations of essential liberties there has been no
obvious gain in security. Complete safety from terrorists is impossible as no amount of
security can absolutely prevent a determined individual from attacking an airplane or
parking a fertilizer bomb outside a daycare. Random, horrific acts of violence, their
destructiveness limited only by the ingenuity, evil, or derangement of the perpetrators,
cannot be stopped. Just four months after a terrorist bomb killed and injured hundreds of
people in Bali, Indonesia on October 12, 2002, a massive fire ripped through a subway
train in Taegu, South Korea, killing well over two hundred people. The subway fire,
however, was not terrorism, but merely the actions of a deranged man armed with a
lighter and accelerant. The chilling ease with which acts of gross violence can be
perpetrated by urban snipers, hijackers, suicide bombers, ex-soldiers with fertilizer
bombs, or madmen with milk cartons of gasoline is clear. Little knowledge, ingenuity,
foresight, planning, intelligence, money, or support infrastructure is required to achieve
mass murder.
¶ 62
Disturbingly, terrorism on a much bigger scale is possible. Mass destruction is no
longer the exclusive privilege of states. A "dirty bomb," for example, "made with a single
foot-long pencil of cobalt from a food irradiation plant and just 10 pounds of TNT"
would render much of Manhattan "as contaminated as the permanently closed area
around the Chernobyl nuclear plant ... ." [See Note 83 below] The degree of difficulty
involved in achieving these results is scarcely more than that involved in filling a rental
truck with fertilizer or a milk carton with gasoline. A visit to any university laboratory or
hospital combined with a side trip to a mining camp or army reserve base is all that is
needed to obtain the raw materials. Well-organized terrorists could aspire to much more,
much aided by the continuing insecurity of both nuclear materials and of the world's
nuclear arsenal. A one kiloton nuclear explosion ("a junk bomb, hardly worthy of respect,
a fifteenth the power of the bomb over Hiroshima") detonated in central New York would
produce:

... 20,000 dead in a matter of seconds. Beyond this, to a distance of more
than a quarter mile, anyone directly exposed to the fireball would die a
gruesome death from radiation sickness within a day ... This larger circle
would be populated by about a quarter million people on a workday. Half a
mile from the explosion ... unshielded onlookers would expect a slower
death from radiation. A mushroom cloud of irradiated debris would
blossom more than two miles into the air, and then, ... highly lethal fallout
would begin drifting back to earth, showering injured survivors and
dooming rescue workers. The poison would ride for 5 or 10 miles on the
prevailing winds ... . [See Note 84 below]
Note 83: Bill Keller "Nuclear Nightmares" New York Times Magazine (26 May 2002) online:
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/05/ 26/magazine/26NUKES.html?ex=1023640203&ei=1&en=
dc0fb9fac851dd13 (date accessed: 30 June 2003).
Note 84: Ibid.

¶ 63
The massive incursions in civil liberties since 9/11 have done little to protect us
from such possibilities. Indeed, U.S. nuclear expert Eugene Harbiger considers it
impossible to protect against such possibilities, stating, "It's not a matter of if; it's a matter
of when." [See Note 85 below]

Note 85: Ibid.

¶ 64
We are left, then, with the unfortunate conclusion that Canada's new laws violate
the very constitutional values that render our society "civil," while simultaneously failing
to protect us from terrorism. The misleading freedom versus security dichotomy distorts
dangerously, reinforcing our cultural obsession with the notoriously blunt instruments of
coercive law, while distracting attention entirely from potentially more useful measures.
The uni-dimensional focus on coercive law has lead us to overlook a wide range of
"security-enhancing measures we could take that would have no effect on freedom."
Recognition "that virtually none of our computer systems, utilities, and urban
infrastructure had been designed from the ground up with security in mind" would allow
us to begin to engage in "a massive redesign of infrastructure ... that could do wonders for
security while not affecting freedom in the least." [See Note 86 below] Though it is
probably impossible to prevent deranged people from fire-bombing subways or
nightclubs, it is possible to improve design standards, so as to make subways, nightclubs,
and cities safer. It is also possible, given the political will, to develop better systems of
emergency response and to more effectively regulate both international arms proliferation
and the highly dangerous materials that are in common industrial use.

Note 86: A. Potter, "How much freedom should we trade for our security?" [unpublished, archived with
the author], referencing Philip Agre, "Some notes on War in a World Without Boundaries," online:
http://dlis.gseis.ucla.edu/people/pagre/ notes-on-war.html (date accessed: 31 July 2003).

¶ 65
The regulatory state has much to offer where the police state lets us down.
Disturbingly, little attention has been focused on such matters to date.
X. CONCLUSION
¶ 66
Soon after 9/11, Paul Krugman warned of "hitchhikers" hijacking "the patriotic
bandwagon" and using it "as a vehicle for their favorite policy proposals." [See Note 87
below]

Note 87: Paul Krugman "Reckonings; The Hitchhiker Syndrome" The New York Times (30 September
2001) online: http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FA0613F93C590C7 38FDDA
00894D9404482 (date accessed: 30 June 2003).

¶ 67
Canada's response to the challenges of international terrorism has been, through
entirely conventional means, reflecting the interests of established state agencies. The
knee-jerk reaction of security bureaucrats has been to move further in the preferred
directions of concentrating power, constraining liberties, and enhancing both criminal
justice and security bureaucracies. It does not augur well that, so far, equivalent efforts in
the direction of controlling dangerous materials, improving urban and systems design, or
enhancing emergency response capabilities, have sadly been lacking in our new state of
permanent war.
¶ 68
It is a real possibility that security establishment "hitchhikers," empowered by
widely shared, though misleading, notions of crime and safety, have dangerously
distorted Canada's constitutional balance, while simultaneously diverting attention from
the difficult challenges involved in enhancing public safety.
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